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Abstract 
Recent advancements in the Internet of Things (IoT) has enabled the collection, processing, 
and analysis of various forms of data including the personal data from billions of objects to 
generate valuable knowledge, making more innovative services for its stakeholders. Yet, this 
paradigm continuously suffers from numerous security and privacy concerns mainly due to its 
massive scale, distributed nature, and scarcity of resources towards the edge of IoT networks. 
Interestingly, blockchain based techniques offer strong countermeasures to protect data from 
tampering while supporting the distributed nature of the IoT. However, the enormous amount 
of energy consumption required to verify each block of data make it difficult to use with 
resource-constrained IoT devices, and with real-time IoT applications. Nevertheless, it can 
expose the privacy of the stakeholders due to its public ledger system even though it secures 
data from alterations. Edge computing approaches suggest a potential alternative to centralized 
processing in order to populate real-time applications at the edge and to reduce privacy 
concerns associated with cloud computing. Hence, this paper suggests the novel privacy 
preserving blockchain called TrustChain which combines the power of blockchains with trust 
concepts to eliminate issues associated with traditional blockchain architectures. This work 
investigates how TrustChain can be deployed in the edge computing environment with 
different levels of absorptions to eliminate delays and privacy concerns associated with 
centralized processing, and to preserve the resources in IoT networks.  
Keywords – Blockchain, Edge Computing, Internet of Things, Privacy, Trust.   
1. Introduction 
Internet of Things (IoT) data is becoming one of the most valuable assets in today’s data-driven 
digital economy as it leads to developing many business models providing numerous 
ubiquitous and intelligent services [1]. However, these data contain sensitive personal 
information and can reveal the identity of the associated stakeholders if a proper privacy 
preserving mechanism is not in place [2].  For example, a malicious actor who has access to 
someone’s personal information (such as their address, date of birth, nationality, bank account 
number, or private e-mail address), can use his identity to gain a financial advantage or obtain 
other benefits in the other person's name. The person whose identity has been assumed may 
suffer adverse consequences, especially if they are responsible for the perpetrator's actions. 
Hence enforcing strong privacy preserving techniques and regulations is necessary. From a 
regulatory point of view, a new data protection act called General Data Protection Regulation 
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(GDPR) was introduced by the European Union (EU) in May 2018 to control the unnecessary 
usage of data, empowering users’ right on their data [3]. It rigorously discusses the importance 
of a “privacy by design” concept which essentially calls for privacy to be considered 
throughout the whole engineering process. 
Worryingly, features of the IoT networks such as their distributed architectures, massive scale, 
and scarcity of the resources with respect to processing power, storage capacity, bandwidth, 
etc., do not provide a safe platform for privacy preserving applications. Further, traditional 
applications of IoT networks are designed in such a way that data management functions, i.e. 
data collection, data storage, data processing, data sharing, and data destruction, are executed 
in a centralized fashion, neglecting the distributed nature of IoT devices. This approach has 
proved to lead to significant delays and traffic congestion when used for delay sensitive 
applications and thus cannot satisfy the requirements of ultra-low delay sensitive IoT 
applications, such as a real-time computer vision for smart city security. It not only heightens 
the issues associated with scalability and latency, but it also makes IoT nodes more vulnerable 
for privacy and security threats, including lack of control over personal data hence 
unauthorized user profiling and identity theft, fake knowledge propagation, network 
eavesdropping, illegal invasion, and denial of service (DoS) attacks.  
On the other hand, a hierarchical edge computing architecture can resolve the issues associated 
with centralized architectures by pushing data pipeline functions towards the edge of the IoT 
networks depending on the resource availability and application requirements [4], [5]. 
Deployment of such an architecture is beneficial to build an ecosystem involving content 
providers, application developers, network equipment vendors, third-party partners, and  
middleware providers; and thereby to improve the end-user experience dramatically due to 
powerful and energy efficient computing power at hand, low latency, mobility, location, and 
context-aware support for IoT applications [6-8]. However, edge computing alone cannot 
support the safeguarding of the privacy of the stakeholders, as it introduces a new set of 
vulnerabilities due to multiple attack surfaces, closeness to sensitive data generators, 
heterogeneity of the device resources, the scale of the network, and difficulty of assessing the 
trustworthiness of participating stakeholders [9].  
The fundamental concept behind blockchain technology provides a promising approach to 
establish a healthy interaction among untrustworthy and unknown entities, while supporting 
the distributed nature of IoT, eliminating the need of a central authority as in cloud computing 
architectures [10], [11]. The main technology of the blockchain lies behind the use of an 
immutable public record of data called “public ledger”, shared among all participants. The 
ledger consists of blocks of data which are linked with each other by a cryptographic hash key 
and the process of linking is termed “Proof of Work” (PoW). However, adopting the blockchain 
technology as it is in the IoT environment is quite challenging due to the exhaustive 
computation power required to solve PoW puzzles with resource-constrained IoT devices. The 
delay associated with the mining process is not suitable for real-time IoT applications, in 
addition to scalability issues associated with blockchain, and further overhead created by 
blockchain consensus algorithms.  
Motivated by the facts stated above, we first propose a novel variation of blockchain called 
TrustChain which removes the need for PoW by utilizing trust evaluation concepts discussed 
in our previous work [12-14]. In general, the concept of trust can be seen as a metric that is 
used to evaluate stakeholders in consideration of mutual benefits, coordination, and 
cooperation. Perception of trust is often achieved with direct observations, through experience 
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and based on the beliefs and opinions of others who are around it as we discussed in [14]. This 
paper also discusses a privacy perceiving edge computing architecture based on the concepts 
of ROOF1, Fog, and Cloud computing concepts [15]. Then, we further extend the idea of 
TrustChain based on the permissioned blockchain concepts to match with the requirements at 
each layer of the proposed distributed architecture. We use a smart city use case to demonstrate 
the proposed ideas in all three cases above.  
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the concepts and underlying 
principles of traditional blockchain technologies and trust evaluation in general to support the 
proposed ideas in the following sections. Section 3 focuses on the details of TrustChain and 
underlying mechanisms compared to typical blockchains. Section 4 discusses the importance 
of the proposed TrustChain when realizing privacy preserving and trustworthy services in a 
distributed environment, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Preliminaries 
In this section, we briefly introduce the concepts and underlying technology associated with 
traditional blockchains and trust evaluation. In the context of TrustChain, we utilize these 
concepts to develop a novel blockchain technology to remove the issues related to privacy and 
efficient use of resources in a decentralized setting like the IoT.   
2.1.  Blockchain Overview 
Blockchain technology is one of the highly researched topics in the recent years, due to its 
distributed and immutable data storage mechanism enabling applications in almost any area 
including banking, supply chain, and other transaction networks like IoT. The concept of 
blockchain was first introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto [16] as the fundamental technology of 
the digital cryptocurrency called Bitcoin. The use of blockchain in public and distributed 
ledgers for Bitcoin transactions made it the first cryptocurrency not only to transact digital 
money in a securely and inexpensive manner but also to resolve the long-standing problem of 
“double spending” without the need for a trusted and powerful third-party. By nature, 
blockchain technology is inherently resistant to data modification due to its public ledger and 
the consensus mechanism called PoW. Once recorded, data in any given block cannot be 
altered retroactively as this would invalidate all hashes in the previous blocks in a blockchain; 
and break the consensus agreed among nodes voiding the blockchain. 
A. Blockchain Architecture 
Blockchain can be basically considered as a chain shaped data structure in which a chain of 
blocks are connected with each other through an address pointer based on a hash value, i.e. 
blockchain is a shared, decentralized, distributed state machine. This means that all nodes 
independently hold their own copy of the blockchain, and the current known "state" is 
calculated by processing each transaction in order as it appears in the blockchain. Each block 
of a blockchain typically contains six parts; hash of the previous block, nonce ("number used 
once"), the hash of the current block, Merkle root (Hash of multiple transactions), timestamp, 
and transaction data as shown in Figure 1.  
                                                 
1 ROOF: Real-time Onsite Operations Facilitations 
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In the context of Bitcoin, transactions generally consist of the sender’s address, recipients 
address, and the value. However, depending on the application this can vary. The header of 
each block contains a set of metadata that helps to validate each block and link to previous 
blocks in the public ledger. Having a public ledger means that the data and access to the system 
is available to anyone who is willing to participate (e.g. Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Litecoin 
blockchain systems). 
 
Figure 1: A typical structure of a blockchain. 
However, depending on the application requirements, the structure of the blockchain can be 
designed either in a more centralized or decentralized manner. In this regard, private 
blockchain architectures are more centralized as they are controlled by a centralized authority 
who controls the access to the blockchain network. Similar to private blockchains, consortium 
blockchains are controlled by a set of selected nodes rather than one specific organization hence 
a suitable candidate for IoT applications.   
B. Consensus and Mining 
Mining is the process that validates the blocks created by the blockchain nodes and attaches 
them to the genesis blockchain. However, the process is a computationally intensive procedure 
due to the cryptographic puzzle that needs to be solved in order to validate the block. In Bitcoin 
networks, this process is called PoW in which miners need to find a suitable nonce that gives 
a unique hash key for each block. Usually, this key is 256 bits long, hence breaking the key is 
extremely hard without controlling 51% of the total computing power available among miners. 
Miners receive a reward when they solve the complex mathematical problem. There are two 
types of rewards: new bitcoins or transaction fees. The overall process of bitcoin mining is 
shown in Figure 2.  
The consensus is the process that allows every node in the blockchain network to agree upon 
connecting the new block to the chain. This involves the mining process as well as other rules 
including the maximum allowable mining time, how to treat blockchain divergence, signing 
transactions into blockchain block, rewarding miners, choosing miners, etc. Other than famous 
PoW consensus protocols, there are other alternatives including the Byzantine Fault Tolerance 
algorithm (BFT) [17], the Proof-of-Stake algorithm (PoS) [18], Delegated Proof-of-Stake 
algorithm (DPoS [19]), etc. [20]. Each of these algorithms is designed to achieve certain 
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agreement among nodes depending on the application area of use while enabling unique 
features like minimum resource requirements, immunity of the protocol, easeness of access 
control, privacy, etc. A comparison of typical consensus algorithms is shown in Table 1.  
 
Figure 2: Bitcoin mining process. 
Table 1: A comparison of typical consensus algorithms [21]. 
Property PoW PoS BFT DPoS 
Identity 
Management 
Open Open Permissioned  Open 
Energy Saving No Partial  Yes Partial 
Immunity 
25% of the 
Computing power 
51% of 
Stake 
33.3% of faulty 
replicas 
51% of 
Validators 
Example  Bitcoin [16] 
Peercoin 
[22] 
Hyperledger 
Fabric [23] 
Bitshares [24] 
 
C. Smart Contracts 
One of the significant parts of a blockchain is the smart contract entity as it bridges the gap 
between prosumers in terms of executing their pre-agreed rules and conditions without a 
centralized authority, i.e. it connects service providers with respectable consumers or connects 
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blockchain service applications. The smart contract codes are otherwise known as executing 
contracts, blockchain contracts, or digital contracts that are stored in the ledger. Transactions 
can invoke smart contract functions. They not only define the rules and penalties around an 
agreement in the same way that a traditional contract does, but also automatically enforce those 
obligations. The concept of smart contract was first introduced by Nick Szabo [25] and is 
widely used in many popular blockchain versions, like in Ethereum [26].  
2.2.  Trust Evaluation Overview 
In general, trust represents a measure of confidence that indicates how much an actor or entity 
will behave in an expected manner in a situation, and how much an actor is willing to rely on 
the actions of another actor or party in the future. The concept of trust is an abstract notion, 
with different meanings depending on both participants and scenarios; and influenced by both 
measurable and non-measurable factors. Hence, inconsistency in trust definitions might lead 
to difficulty in establishing a common, general notation that holds regardless of personal 
dispositions or differing situations. To avoid such ambiguity, we define trust as “a qualitative 
or quantitative property of a trustee measured by a trustor for a given task in a specific context 
and in a specific time period” as in [14]. In the context of IoT, trust can be identified as a 
feature that affects the appetite of an object to consume a particular service or product offered 
by another. This can be observed in everyday life, where trust decisions are made. When 
purchasing a specific product, we may favor certain brands due to our trust that these brands 
will provide excellent quality compared to unknown brands. Trust in these brands may come 
from our knowledge, experience of using their products, or from their reputations, which are 
perceived by other people who bought items and left their opinions about those products. 
Although the significance of trust in our physical world is as important as it is in the digital 
environment, building trust and confidence in the latter is much more difficult. This is due to 
our inability to have a physical view of an object, unlike in our physical world, where we can 
view the building of the bank, observe its safe deposits, meet the bank personnel, etc. Another 
issue with trust is that it is difficult to quantify the exact trustworthiness value of an object. 
This is even harder when each object has different interpretations and perceptions of the term 
“trustworthy”. Therefore, they may assign different trustworthiness values to the same provider 
or the service. For example, a service consumer assigns “very trustworthy” to the provider for 
a transaction that he has performed. However, another consumer assigns “untrustworthy” for a 
similar transaction from the same provider. These differences further increase the difficulty in 
determining the exact trustworthiness of an object.  
Despite difficulties in trust evaluation, it shows quite a significant potential towards eliminating 
risks related to privacy and preserving the integrity of the interactions. Hence, we borrow a 
definition for trust and the trust model from our previous work in [12-14] to formulate the 
foundation in this work. We identify three Trust Metrics (TMs) to identify, evaluate and create 
trust relationships among objects in the IoT endowment namely; Knowledge, Experience, and 
Reputation. Each TM is a collective representation of several Trust Attributes (TAs) and each 
TA represents the trustworthiness feature of a trustee as shown in Figure 3.  
 7 
 
Figure 3: Accumulation of Trust Attributes (TAs) towards Trust Metrics (TMs) and formation of a Trust Value. 
The knowledge TM covers all aspects of direct trust evaluations, which provide a perception 
about a trustee before and during an interaction. To make this possible, it must provide relevant 
data to the trustor for its assessment. If a data feature can be represented using a quantitative 
measurement, then the result is a numerical value in a certain range. As an example, social 
relationships like co-location and co-work, credibility factors like cooperativeness, time-
dependent features like the frequency and duration of interactions, and spatial distribution of 
relevant trustees compared to the trustor can be used as direct trust measurements. The main 
purposes of trust assessments are to facilitate more intelligent decision making and task 
delegation. In this regard, we further elaborate two further metrics, which come under the 
knowledge TM as non-social TMs and social TMs. In non-social trust, the idea is to find 
whether the trustor can rely on physical or cyber objects, and social trust determines whether a 
trustor can depend on other social objects. 
After acquiring enough evidence about trustees through the knowledge TM, the trustor can 
initiate collaborations with selected trustees based on the perception that the trustor has already 
obtained. However, the result of these interactions might differ from the perception and hence 
it is critical to keep a record of each individual experience to be used in future interactions. For 
instance, the experience might be feedback from consumers after each transaction (as used in 
many e-commerce systems), just a Boolean value (0/1) indicating whether a service transaction 
successfully operates (as in some reputation-based trust systems), etc. Then, by accumulating 
these experiences over time in relation to the corresponding contexts, tasks and times, the 
trustor can build up additional intelligence compared to the knowledge TM. To further enhance 
the perception of the trustor, other objects can share their experience in using the trustee, upon 
a request by the trustor, which we identify as reputation or the global opinion of the trustee. As 
an example, we have created a non-bias PageRank based model to calculate the reputation 
values of trustees in a distributed network as in [27]. In summary, the experience TM is a 
personal observation considering only interactions from a trustor to a trustee, whereas the 
reputation TM reflects the global opinion of the trustee. 
According to the model in Figure 3, the first step of the trust evaluation is to estimate relevant 
TMs depending on the application. However, this information is not readily available and 
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therefore attributes which define these TMs must be obtained. There are numerous methods 
available to estimate these TAs ranging from numerical methods, probabilistic methods, belief 
theory, to Machine Learning (ML) methods. In simple terms, the mathematical approach to 
find the trust value trustor “i” and trustee “j” can be represented as in (1). 
 𝐾𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼1𝐾1 + 𝛼2𝐾2 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑛𝐾𝑛 
𝐸𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽1𝐸1 + 𝛽2𝐸2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝐸𝑛 
𝑅𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾1𝑅1 + 𝛾2𝑅2 + ⋯ + 𝛾𝑛𝑅𝑛 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 =  𝜃1𝐾𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃2𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑗 
(1)  
where ,,, and , are weighting factors that normalize each metric in between 0 and 1. Kx, 
Ex, and Rx represent the TMs; Knowledge, Experience, and Reputation, respectively.  
3. TrustChain Platform 
In this section, we present the underlying mechanisms involved with the TrustChain platform 
which is, an alternative initiation of traditional blockchain in terms of preserving privacy, 
distributed nature, and the computational resources. In contrast to many issues associated with 
traditional blockchains as discussed in Section 2.1, the TrustChain is powered with several 
advantages including:  
• Efficient mining scheme that does not depend on computing resources but mutual 
agreements and trust among them; 
• Significantly small mining delay compared to PoW; 
• Enhanced scalability due to associated distributed storage mechanism; 
• Improved privacy due to intelligent encryption algorithm running inside the TrustChain 
to hide/minimize the personal data exposure; 
• Compatibility with IoT business models due to permissioned nature of TrustChain, 
while maintaining the distributed and autonomous decision-making capability without 
relying on a central validator who has control over each node; and 
• Interoperability among several TrustChains as well as with external traditional 
blockchain due to the application of smart contracts inside TrustChains.  
In order to provide such competency over traditional rivalries like Bitcoin, Ethereum, and 
Hyperledger, TrustChain is equipped with unique services which provide the aforementioned 
properties. Hence, we propose several services that must be combined with traditional 
blockchain service as shown in Figure 4.  
Furthermore, to tackle the issues related to privacy in traditional blockchain networks, our 
proposed TrustChain service should be designed in compliance with data and privacy 
regulation standards like GDPR [3]. While the principles of data accountability and 
transparency have previously been implicit requirements of data protection law, GDPR further 
extends the requirements of authorities by introducing explicit provisions that promote data 
accountability and governance to protect the privacy of personal data. GDPR defines three 
participant roles, namely Data Subject (DS), Data Controller (DC), and Data Processor (DP), 
and specifies their associated obligations under EU data protection law. In this regard, we adopt 
the permissioned blockchain concept in order to design the TrustChain platform as it allows 
the prosumers to control the data visibility through access control and consensus mechanisms. 
Also, the use of smart contracts enables DSs, DCs, and DPs to impose and to negotiate consent 
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rules for finalizing an agreement on data usage as legal grounds by means of a usage control 
language. We believe our proposed TrustChain platform is a promising approach for 
developing a secure and trusted data management in Smart Cities that fully complies with 
GDPR. 
 
Figure 4: Core services of TrustChain platform.  
 
Figure 5: TrustChain Services in the Global Distributed TrustChain and local TrustChain Networks. 
3.1. Trust Service 
Formally, we define trust as in Section 2.2 and use it as a service in this section to empower 
each aspect of TrustChain to design a lightweight consensus algorithm as investigated in 
Section 3.2, administer smart contracts as described in Section 3.3, manage membership and 
policies as in Section 3.4, and importantly, to protect the privacy of the users in compliance 
with GDPR legislation as described in this section. The trust service in a Distributed 
TrustChain Edge Node (DTCEN) network is implemented as a logical Trust Service Chain 
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(TSC) as shown in Figure 5. Then based on the requirements of TrustChain platform, trust 
service is provided on demand to both local TrustChain stored in ROOF node/IoT Trust agents 
(such as a home router) and global distributed TrustChain stored in the DTCEN network. 
Additionally, the DTCEN network is allowed to keep a public ledger alongside private ledger 
depending on the application scenarios, user consents, and privacy policies of participating 
nodes. When there is a requirement to validate a block, engage with smart contract service, or 
to manage the membership of the stakeholders, TSC will be triggered among the relevant actors 
to evaluate trust based on the methods discussed below and thereby to assist the obligation in 
place.     
Essentially, the trust service is a result of various trust evaluation models and management 
functionalities. It is important to note that, the equations in (1) represent the overall processes 
of TM/TA segmentation, evaluation, and aggregation which is needed to establish trust service 
irrespective of the area of application and only the TAs which represent the features of a given 
situation are different to each other. For example, the trust evaluation model based on features 
of an entity, integrity of data, and associate privacy requirements are shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Trust evaluation based on Object trust model, Data trust model, and Privacy trust model. 
However, having an appropriate trust model is not enough in evaluating trust and hence a Trust 
Management and Evaluation (TME) module addresses the whole process from data collection 
to trust evaluation as shown in Figure 7. To support such processes, the TME module is 
equipped with several important sub-modules, Trust Agent (TAG), Trust Data Access Object 
(TDAO), IPFS enabled Data Repository (DR), TA Extractor (TAE), Trust Information 
Analysis (TIA), AI Engine (AIE), Trust Modelling Algorithm (TMA), and Trust Lifecycle 
Management module (TLM). These modules will perform one or more tasks at a time to 
evaluate trust. 
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TAG basically collects appropriate trust data from all the sources, including DC, DP, and DS 
objects who provide designated services, a trust broker who coordinates with external 
reputation systems, and TME API that provides an interface to extract data from external 
objects, environment and other repositories in order to determine relevant TAs for trust 
evaluation. Generally, TAG works similarly to the client-server application, in which objects 
and the TME module change their role depending on the direction of data flow. The data could 
be either information obtained directly from relevant parties, experience or opinions of objects 
as reputation or feedbacks from/to other objects, applications or services. Once the TAG inside 
the TME module acquires the data, it will be stored in the local repository to be used by other 
sub-modules inside the TME module. To facilitate easy access to data in a distrusted setting, 
an Inter-Planetary File System (IPFS) based data repository is used in addition to local storage 
at each node.  
Having obtained the necessary information by TAG, the next step is to assess the TA with help 
from TAE and AIE. Once TAs are assessed, they will be processed by TIA in combination 
with TMA to aggregate all the TAs based on the techniques like numerical, statistical, ML or 
ensemble approaches as discussed in [12-14]. The TMA should work together with the TAE 
and TIA to find the best possible metrics for each model. Some models will combine the 
metrics according to pre-defined rules or policies, while others will generate these rules and 
policies dynamically to suit the situation in the best possible way. Finally, estimated trust 
information is transmitted towards the relevant party for appropriate decision-making 
processes.  
 
Figure 7: Trust management and evaluation module. 
3.2.  Blockchain Service 
The blockchain service enables prosumers to interact with each other without a centralized 
authority but with a community of peers in the form of a peer-to-peer (p2p) network, in which 
trust is not placed in an individual, but rather distributed across the entire population. Hence, 
no one can unilaterally take actions on behalf of the community and change the interactions. 
Moreover, the distributed nature of blockchains enables both horizontal and vertical service 
provision depending on the application requirement. As shown in Figure 8, different layers of  
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Figure 8: Composition of services via TrustChains in a smart city. 
TrustChains are established by their responsible computing authority. A permissioned 
TrustChain at the Fog and ROOF layers are implemented, as service providers at the Fog and 
ROOF layers have better control over the network. However, there are no TrustChains 
occupied in the cloud layer due to the p2p nature of the TrustChains and privacy issues related 
to centralized processing. To explain the applicability of TrustChain in a real-world scenario, 
a smart city use case has been utilised. In this scenario, the bottom layers represent IoT nodes 
like sensors, smartphones, tablets, etc. and ROOF agents such as hubs, routers, home servers, 
etc. To facilitate localized services which demand real-time decision-making capabilities like 
in emergency services, energy management services, etc. TrustChains in ROOF will work 
together through smart contracts among them. Due to the lightweight attribute of the consensus 
protocol suggested below, even a ROOF node has the ability to validate new blocks and add 
them to the genesis TrustChain improving the overall performance of the IoT local network.  
At the area level, a collection of distributed servers at the Fog layer can establish a permissioned 
blockchain based on the data coming from ROOF nodes, as well as data stored in the DTCENs 
to facilitate near real time services. Further, depending on the computational power available 
to Fog nodes, it is possible to deploy artificial intelligence and data mining techniques to obtain 
extra knowledge about a situation to respond it correctly. Global TrustChain at Fog layer will 
act as a control layer in such cases to orchestrate the services required by area level applications 
in a smart city. In order to improve the interoperability among several TrustChains, 
decentralized exchange (DEX) will act as a broker as shown in Figure 8. A detail 
implementation of DEX based on the smart contract service is discussed in Section 3.3.  
With respect to data management, it is not required to send all the data through the blockchain 
and depending on the user consent some of the data can be directly transmitted towards the 
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upper layer for immediate processing as denoted with “Direct Communication” in Figure 8. 
Furthermore, smart contracts can be used to negotiate between actors to trigger certain services 
stored in the TrustChain or to find the services stored in a separate database and generate a 
combined result. The scenario applies to Fog and cloud level in a similar manner and the 
concept of smart contract can also be used as a DEX to communicate in between layers when 
taking higher level decisions such as at the cloud layer.Additionally, it is beneficial to identify 
different types of nodes depending on their capabilities on forming a TrustChain in terms of 
storage and verification as shown in Table 2. Full nodes are capable of storing both the full 
TrustChain and the verification by triggering the consensus protocol discussed later in this 
section. Heavy nodes are mostly confined with limited storage and hence only stores 
TrustChain below the Fog layer, and if further processing is required it will initiate a smart 
contract with cloud-based nodes to establish full TrustChain depending on the application. 
Light nodes are only capable of storing TrustChain headers and often not able to add any blocks 
to the chain as their resources are limited for performing verification. Data issuers are simply 
the IoT devices and sensors. They can choose to store data in TrustChains which are handled 
by upper layers, or directly send the data towards upper layers without depositing the data on 
TrustChain for fast processing after evaluating the privacy requirements and consents from 
users via the trust service. It is important to establish smart contracts between different types 
of TrustChains to ensure privacy by design concept. Hence, different types of distributed 
ledgers are proposed to store data, smart contracts, and cryptocurrency separately and 
connected by DEXs. 
Table 2: Categorization of Node Types in TrustChain Networks. 
Node Type Storage Validation 
Full Node (e.g. Cloud nodes) Full TrustChain Yes 
Heavy Node (e.g. Fog Nodes) TrustChain below Fog Possible 
Light Node (e.g. ROOF Nodes) Mostly store block headers only  Rarely 
Data Issuers (e.g. Sensors, IoT nodes) None No 
Further, to limit the usage of TrustChain for data storage, it is possible to integrate TrustChain 
with parallel distributed architecture [28] that separates the data layer from the control layer 
using TrustChain. Then the data generated by each node at each layer is stored in a local 
database and TrustChain only holds the reference to data that serve as the identifier to verify 
the correctness and integrity of data. This enables TrustChain to act as a control channel to 
record the overall state of the IoT system including resources and service availability. Hence, 
the removal of redundant data storage will enable storing more information into a single block 
with the same block size, which can significantly improve the transaction processing speed. 
Moreover, cooperation between nodes can effectively improve the efficiency of the entire IoT 
system.  
3.2.1. Trust-based Consensus Management Protocol  
As we highlighted in Section 2.1, many consensus management protocols have been developed 
in both permissioned and permissionless blockchain networks to minimize the computing 
resources required for mining, minimize mining delay and to improve robustness against a 
large number of distributed nodes. However, all these techniques were in the assumption of the 
trustless nature of blockchain, even though the trust factor places a major role in the blockchain 
ecosystem; ranging from choosing the right business partner for trustworthy service 
provisioning, to creating a trustworthy mining process. Therefore, we identify trust as an 
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important property on validating the blocks in the proposed TrustChain and provide 
comprehensive details on how to achieve it in this section. In contrast to well-known consensus 
mining techniques like PoW, PoS, PoA, etc., the algorithm proposed here is uniquely identified 
as Proof-of-Trust (PoT) throughout this paper. 
In the TrustChain or even in other blockchain versions, miners’ task is to verify individual data 
blocks and connect them with the genesis chain. However, to be a miner in conventional mining 
schemes, miners must have either computational power, wealth, authority or similar type of 
advantage over others. Similarly, in the PoT method, a group of nodes who have maintained 
higher-level trustworthiness are chosen as the governing property to be selected as miners or 
“Trust Bloggers” (TB) in the TrustChain network. Furthermore, in the consensus process in 
PoW, anyone with a mining rig can participate in consensus and miners can join and leave the 
network without impacting consensus. On the other hand, Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) 
mining-based methods use the centralized validator list chosen by a central authority. Even 
though BFT based methods show good performance against the use of efficient resources as 
the underlying mechanism is based on a voting system, it still lacks the decentralized nature of 
mining as the selection of validators is controlled by the centralized manner in permissioned 
blockchain networks [29]. In such cases, anyone can spin up a validator, but it can only 
participate in consensus if the authority adds the new node to the validator list. This 
requirement for a recommended validator list means that BFT follows a closed membership 
system.  
Motivated by the BFT based methods, a voting system relying on the trust service is used in 
the TrustChain network for the consensus mining process. However, the selection of TBs in 
the TrustChain network is not controlled by a central authority and allows any node who has 
enough trustworthiness to be selected as a blogger. In TrustChain, each TB decides which other 
TB they trust using the trust management services given under the Trust Service Component 
as disuse in Section 3.1. The list of TBs is called the Trust Blogger Pool (TBP) in the context 
of TrustChain. Depending on the network size, service distribution, type of TrustChain and 
availability of trust attributes to calculate trust, multiple segments of TBPs with various pool 
sizes and overlapping sections create the global TBP which covers the whole IoT network, 
strengthening the distributed nature of IoT further as shown in Figure 9. Due to the open 
membership nature of TBP, anyone can spin up a validator and participate in consensus 
because there is no single master authority deciding which nodes get to participate in the 
consensus process. Inherently, it allows for growing decentralization unlike BFT as more and 
more nodes are added to the network and form new pools around them making it difficult for 
a malicious miner to interfere with the voting process. For example, unlike PoW or BFT based 
systems, no single party can own 51% of a global trust network in TrustChain technology, as 
the selection of TBs based on trustworthiness in contrast to factors like computing power, 
authority, wealth, and etc. which can be controlled to gain unfair advantages.   
However, when pools are not overlapping with each other, there is a possibility that different 
pools may maintain a different copy of the TrustChains and it will put the overall consensus 
mechanism in jeopardy. In such cases, a smart contract between the disjoint TBPs can be 
created to continue the voting process while preserving their pool sizes as it is. On the other 
hand, a limited number of trustworthy authorities like government control bodies can be 
selected as the TBs to overcome any disjoints, assuming their inherited trustworthiness. Yet, 
the later solution might reduce the power of the decentralized architecture of the TrustChain to 
some extent. Therefore, it is important to consider a minimum level of trustworthiness when it 
comes to the selection of TBs to avoid disjoint TBPs.  
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In contrast to BFT based methods, we propose to use the REK model, discussed in Section 2.2, 
based on our previous work [14] to assist the TB selection process. We follow the same 
procedure mentioned in (11) to calculate the Experience TM and Reputation TM. However, 
TAs which represent the Knowledge TM must be redefined to grasp the true features of TBs 
including its social properties and dependable properties. TAs which define social properties 
like Co-Location, Co-Work, Cooperativeness, Frequency, Length of Interactions, Mutuality, 
Centrality, and Community of Interest assists to catch how well the TBs have behaved in the 
past to uphold the moral standards of the TrustChain network while dependable TAs like: 
reliability, availability, safety, integrity, maintainability, and confidentially [30]. There are 
many models that can be seen in the literature to quantify dependable properties like in [30-
32]. Therefore, this paper formulates numerical models to analyze social TAs as described in 
Section 3.1 based on our previous work in [14]. Once, both social and dependable TAs are 
calculated, a cumulative score for Knowledge TM can be obtained as in (2). Further, combining 
it with (11), the trust value of each candidate TB can be modeled as in (3). 
 
Figure 9: Consortium of Trust Bloggers (TBs) and Trust Blogger Pools (TBPs) in the TrustChain network. 
 𝐾𝑖𝑗(𝑡) =  𝜌. 𝐾𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝜎. 𝐾𝑖𝑗
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
 (2)  
 
 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑇𝐵 =  𝛼. 𝐸𝑇𝐵 +  𝛽. 𝑅𝑇𝐵 +  𝛾. 𝐾𝑇𝐵  (3)  
Where TrustTB represents the trustworthiness of TB and KTB, ETB, and RTB denotes the TMs 
based on Knowledge, Experience, and Reputation. Based on the trust value of TBs, one who 
has the highest trustworthiness is chosen as the leader for a specific TBP and broadcast it to 
other nodes in the pool with the leader’s digital signature. Upon receiving the signature from 
the leader, other nodes can verify it and then acknowledge it with their own signatures. The 
leader is mainly responsible for managing the consensus process until its term period has 
expired. Once the term of a leader has expired, a new leader must be chosen based on the 
highest trustworthiness value of a node.  
After a leader is elected, he chooses a list of deputy candidates for the blogging or in other 
words the validating process. In order to select such TB candidate list, the leader TB evaluates 
his trust relationships with other prospective candidates for TBs and chooses the ones that have 
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the highest trust relationships with him. To determine the satisfactory margin of 
trustworthiness, a threshold value or machine learning approach is used, as described in [14]. 
Then the leader TB sends the list to other nodes to cross-check their relationship with the 
selected TB list. If the other nodes are happy with the trust level, they can respond back to the 
leader with their approval or simply ignore it to show the disproval. Then based on the votes 
from nodes, the ones who have higher votes will be selected as the final candidate list for the 
blogging process and will be broadcast back again to inform the other nodes in the pool. The 
overall process of selecting a leader and candidate TB list is shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: Trust-based Consensus Management Protocol. 
Once the leader and candidate TB list are decided, nodes can initiate transactions and broadcast 
messages to the TBP with their signatures which can be generated by taking the hash of both 
the message and their Secret Key (SK) as in (4). Furthermore, freedom is given to the message 
generator to encrypt messages using a suitable encryption mechanism or to anonymize the data 
depending on the privacy requirement in contrast to conventional blockchains. Upon receiving 
these blocks by TBs, they can first validate the message using verification function denotes in 
(5) and the senders Public Key (PK). 
 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑆𝐾) = 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒  (4)  
   
 Verify(Message, Signature, PK) =True / False (5) 
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Then, based on the result of the verification function, each TB can vote for adding this specific 
message to a block in the genesis chain. If the leader receives votes to include the block in the 
genesis chain, it generates a header for the message and the resulting block is added to the 
existing chain. If he receives contradictory votes or votes do not have a majority then the 
message is ignored as it can tamper with malicious intentions. The process of adding each new 
block to a genesis chain is shown in Figure 10. 
3.3. Smart Contract Service 
Smart contracts are simply self-executing and immutable codes that reside in a blockchain. 
They essentially remove the need for a central broker due to their self-executing nature and can 
be triggered upon receiving a request from IoT nodes, other TrustChains, or by the smart 
contract itself based on the self-triggering rules inside the contract. In the TrustChain service, 
smart contracts are stored in a separate chain to improve the efficiency associated process like 
creating, storing, executing, and terminating. The registry component in the smart contract 
service basically register newly deployed contracts by issuing an address, name, and version 
and help to track the outcome of the contract once it is initiated by storing the hash of the result. 
A secure container includes a secure operating system, smart contract language, runtime 
environment, and a software development kit to create and run the smart contracts with in the 
TrustChain service.  
Even though smart contracts work in a trust-less manner after signing the contract, it is 
beneficial to have a trust evaluation mechanism in place before the contract is signed to 
implement proactive measures to avoid contract violations. Hence, smart contract service 
discussion is coupled with the trust service to identify accountabilities and enforce them 
autonomously. For example, let’s consider a distributed market place in a smart city use case 
in which stakeholder exchange goods for cryptocurrencies. In a normal condition, the seller 
must ship the items as soon as he received the transaction from the customer. On the other 
hand, in case of the seller deliberately delaying the shipment, the smart contract will be 
triggered, and money will be refunded to the customer’s account. However, this process might 
involve some transaction fees and a waste of effort in the perspective of the customer. Hence, 
to avoid such outcome, the trust service is used to evaluate the trustworthiness of the 
prospective sellers based on the REK model, discussed in [14], and recommend appropriate 
stakeholders before establishing the smart contract.  
Let’s assume Alice (a) the IoT user needs to find a good banker, say Bob (b), and they need to 
establish a smart contract for their mutual interactions. For the generality, let us take the trust 
level between any IoT node “a” and “b”, with respect to a’s preference is denoted by Trustab, 
similar to concepts discussed in Section 3.2 and our previous work [12-14]. Then the trust level 
between “a” and “b” is calculated as in (6). 
 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏 =  𝛼. 𝐸𝑎𝑏 +  𝛽. 𝑅𝑎𝑏 (6)  
Where, Eab denotes the experience between “a” and “b”, Rab calculates the reputation of “b”,  
and  and β are normalizing coefficients to bring the final scores in between 0 and 1. Note that 
we have deliberately omitted calculating Knowledge TM as it needed personal information to 
evaluate the trust based on knowledge. To calculate the Experience TM and Reputation TM, 
we recall the concept of directed graph theory from Section IV of [27] as in Figure 11. Note 
that, Figure 11 only shows the relative interaction distance among each other and it does not 
represent the actual physical distance between them.  
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Figure 11: Experience and Reputation flow among IoT nodes. 
Let’s take TA evaluation of the jth transaction with node x as vx(j), successfulness of the jth 
transaction with node x as ax(j) and time attenuation function between current time and 
transaction time w.r.t. node x as tx(i,  t). Then the experience between “a” and “b” can be 
calculated as in (7).  
 
𝐸𝑎𝑏 = 𝑇𝑎𝑏
𝐻 . 𝐸𝑏  
= 𝑇𝑎𝑏
𝐻 .
∑ 𝑣𝑏(𝑗)𝑎𝑏(𝑗)𝑡𝑏(𝑗, ∆𝑡)
𝑚
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑎𝑏(𝑗)𝑡𝑏(𝑗, ∆𝑡)
𝑚
𝑗=1
 
 
 
 
(7) 
Where H denotes the hop distance to the trustee “b”; THab represents the transition matrix 
between “a” and “b” and unique value at (a,b) of the THab represents the connection between 
“a” and “b”; and tx(i,  t) with respect to arbitrary node x can be calculated as in (8). However, 
the evaluation of vx(j) is context and content dependent and TAs that governs the particular 
transaction must be intelligently selected in order to evaluate the vx(j). For example, TAs like 
response time, timely delivery, quality of the product/service, fees associated, etc. can be taken 
into consideration in this example. Moreover, successfulness of the jth transaction denoted by 
ax(j) can be defined based on the criticalness of the application. For example, it can be either 0 
or 1 for strict applications while it can be varied in between for other cases.  
 
𝑡𝑥(𝑗, ∆𝑡) = {
1 ∆𝑡 < 𝛼
𝑒−∆𝑡 𝛼 < ∆𝑡 < 𝛽
0 𝛽 <  𝑡
 
 
(8) 
Where α and β represent the threshold values that adjust the importance of the transaction in 
consideration relative to the current time. If the application demands more recent transaction 
in order to evaluate the trust, then β must be set very close to the origin. Following the same 
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procedure as above and the model discussed in Section IV of  [27], the reputation of “b” can 
be calculated as in (9). 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑏 = ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑏
𝑛 . d(n). 𝑅𝑏
𝑁=6
𝑛=1
 
= ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑏
𝑛 . d(n).
𝑁=6
𝑛=1
∑ 𝑣𝑛(𝑗)𝑎𝑛(𝑗)𝑡𝑛(𝑗, ∆𝑡)
𝑚
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑎𝑛(𝑗)𝑡𝑛(𝑗, ∆𝑡)
𝑚
𝑗=1
 
 
 
(9) 
Where, vn(j), an(j), and tn(i,  t) take their useful meaning as discussed above but with respect 
to node “n” or else they represent the reputation value of “b” with respect to node “n”. Note 
that the hop count from node “b” is limited to six here based on the “small world problem” 
discussed in [33], in which authors argue that any node is reachable within the range of six 
hopes.  Further, based on the nth value, the reputation is attenuated by a factor of d(n) as in (10) 
to reduce the effect of reputation that far away nodes holds on to node “b”.  
 
𝑑(𝑛) =
7 − 𝑛
6
 
 
(10) 
After that, the final trust score of the node “b” with respect to “a” can be obtained by 
substituting (7) and (9) into (6) as shown in (11). 
 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏 = 𝛼. 𝐸𝑎𝑏 +  𝛽. 𝑅𝑎𝑏 
= 𝛼. 𝑇𝑎𝑏
𝐻 .
∑ 𝑣𝑏(𝑗)𝑎𝑏(𝑗)𝑡𝑏(𝑗, ∆𝑡)
𝑚
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑎𝑏(𝑗)𝑡𝑏(𝑗, ∆𝑡)
𝑚
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽. ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑏
𝑛 . d(n).
𝑁=6
𝑛=1
∑ 𝑣𝑛(𝑗)𝑎𝑛(𝑗)𝑡𝑛(𝑗, ∆𝑡)
𝑚
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑎𝑛(𝑗)𝑡𝑛(𝑗, ∆𝑡)
𝑚
𝑗=1
 
 
 
(11) 
Further, TrustChain is designed with the requirement of interoperability in mind to enable 
DEX. Due to the autonomous nature of executing prearranged rules and also its ability to 
become embedded inside TrustChain networks, smart contracts provide a promising approach 
to implement DEX in the TrustChain network. Having DEX capability not only assists in 
maintaining a different ledger in TrustChain for different services like Data, Transactions, 
Trust, Policy/Membership, and Smart Contracts itself but also allows communication with 
external blockchains whenever necessary, minimizing content exposure preserving privacy of 
the users as well as their data. Nevertheless, this type of smart contract based DEX enables the 
deployment of complex use case scenarios like a smart city with millions of IoT nodes 
possessing different resources and service subscriptions. For example, Figure 12 illustrates a 
scenario where several distributed ledgers interact together through the smart contract ledger. 
In such a framework, a node can deposit its data in “Data Ledger”, transactions based on 
cryptocurrencies in “Transactions Ledger”, and create, execute, or terminate smart contracts 
via the “Smart Contract Ledger”. Consequently, associated managing functions related to the 
above example will be triggered through the smart contract ledger by the “Trust Service 
Ledger” and “Policy and Membership Ledger”.  
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Figure 12: TrustChain distributed and interoperable ledgers. 
TrustChain must ensure the privacy of the stakeholders in both internal and external 
interactions whenever possible as per the GDPR. Hence, we propose to use the concept of Zero 
Knowledge Proof (ZKP) to hide the user information when interacting with service providers 
through smart contracts [34]. Let’s assume an IoT node belonging to Alice (Prover) needs to 
retrieve confidential documents from Bob (Verifier). For that, Alice needs to prove her identity 
to Bob by providing her Name, Date of Birth and Social Security Number (SSN). However, if 
she provided this information, Bob can use this data for other purposes like user profiling or 
share with third parties for monetary gain. To avoid that ZKP can be used to prove the identity 
of Alice without sending the actual information her. In order to improve the robustness of the 
algorithm against hiding identity information, this paper proposes to combine the ZKP with 
Diffie–Hellman key exchange algorithm [35] to create a novel consensus protocol for smart 
contracts on hiding personal data as in the Algorithm I. 
Algorithm I : ZKP with DH to Suppress Personal Information Exposure  
1: 
 
2: 
3: 
4: 
5: 
6: 
7: 
8: 
9: 
10: 
11: 
12: 
13: 
 
Trust Service selects two large random prime numbers p (Prime) and g (Generator) s.t. 
256<p,g and communicate to both Alice and Bob. 
Alice generates hash of her information and store in x=SHA256(Name, DoB, SSN). 
Alice calculates k1=gx mod p and sends it to Bob. 
Bob takes the hash of his request and store in y, s.t. 0<y<p. 
Bob calculates k2=gy mod p and sends it to Alice. 
Alice calculates the shared secret key, sk= (k2)x mod p. 
Bob calculates the shared secret key, sk= (k1)y mod p. 
Alice generates another random oracle v, s.t. 0<v<p.   
Alice calculates her commitment, t= (k1)v + (sk)v. 
Alice calculates the challenge, C=SHA256(g, sk,  t). 
Alice sends the response, r=(v.x – C.x) mode p  and challenge C to Bob. 
Bob calculate the commitment, t’= gr. (k1)C +(k2) r. (sk)C and challenge C’=SHA256(g, sk,  t’). 
If C= C’, Bob can satisfy that Alice has provided the requested information.   
Note that Bob and Alice share only g, p, and their public keys (k1, k2).There is no way that an 
eavesdropper can interfere with the identification process without knowing the secret keys of 
Alice and Bob. Moreover, what is inside the two hash functions C and C’ must be similar in 
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order to satisfy the condition C= C’. Hence, essentially Alices’ commitment t must be equal to 
t’ as shown in (12).  
 𝑡′ = 𝑔𝑟 . 𝑘1
𝐶 + 𝑘2
𝑟 . 𝑠𝑘
𝐶  
= 𝑔(𝑣.𝑥 – 𝐶.𝑥). (𝑔𝑥)𝐶 + (𝑔𝑦)(𝑣.𝑥 – 𝐶.𝑥). (𝑔𝑥𝑦)𝐶  
= 𝑔(𝑣.𝑥) +  𝑔(𝑣.𝑥.𝑦) 
= 𝑘1
𝑣 + 𝑠𝑘
𝑣 
= 𝑡 
 
 
(12)  
3.4.  Membership and Policy Service 
By design, TrustChain platform is developed as a permissioned type of blockchain to control 
the privacy matters associated with a public blockchain and support business requirements 
demands by the service providers. Therefore, all nodes who need a TrustChain service are 
required to register with the membership services in order to obtain an identity to access the 
distributed services in TrustChain; such as carrying out transactions, obtaining services offered 
by service providers, interacting with smart contracts, etc. However, as there are no centralized 
authorities in a TrustChain network to manage such credentials, the responsibility relies on the 
TB with the support from the trust service discussed in Section 3.1. The selection of TBs is 
discussed in Section 3.2 under the consensus management protocol. Fundamentally, when 
assigning an identity by TB to a prospective node, it will first evaluate the trustworthiness of 
the node with respect to the services he is demanding. The trust evaluation process follows a 
similar approach as discussed in previous sections and if the trust level is at the expectation 
level, the node is granted to enter the TrustChain network with restricted permission based on 
his trust level. It is up to the node to behave and collaborate in a good manner to improve his 
reputation over the time if he needs to access more advanced services including becoming a 
TB.  
Policy services mainly manage areas such as preserving the privacy of the prosumers, 
monitoring consents, meeting consensus rules and ensuring accountability in case of policy 
violations. In this regard, the trust service can support to track such rules to detect violations 
beforehand and take necessary countermeasures in case of an incident already occurring. A 
more detailed version of implementing such a system is discussed in our previous work [13], 
in compliance with GDPR legislation when it comes to privacy matters.   
4. Discussion 
4.1.  TrustChain vs Privacy Compliance 
The initial version of blockchains like Bitcoin [16] and Ethereum [26] were designed and 
developed to facilitate trustless data management, transparency, and promote the 
decentralization aspects. However, they lack the fundamental requirement of privacy when it 
comes to managing personal and proprietary information in an IoT ecosystem. Several 
blockchain technologies were invested later to rectify these privacy issues based on the 
permissioned and private blockchain concepts like Hyperledger Fabric [23]. However, due to 
interference from centralized authorities in managing membership and consensus protocols, 
they also had to compromise the initial properties of blockchains like decentralization 
capabilities and scalability in a setting like the IoT.  
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In contrast, TrustChain is designed in such a way that it only stores the information allowed by 
the users. Techniques like ZKP, encryption, and anonymization are used to hide the sensitive 
data while communicating amongst relevant stakeholders and evaluate trust accordingly 
without affecting the privacy. The ZKP algorithm suggested in the text is one of the promising 
techniques used in the TrustChain to communicate amongst parties without revealing their 
personal information. This property satisfies the GDPR requirements under the right to object 
processing and right to control profiling using personal information. Further, it allows 
encryption and other anonymization techniques within TrustChain to hide delicate information 
as it is not required to maintain a public ledger system like in a Bitcoin blockchain. Hence the 
user is given the right to restrict processing as per the GDPR legislation. On other hand, an 
application of parallel distributed architectures enables the storing of sensitive data in a local 
database and linking the data to TrustChain through a cryptographic link, which in fact allows 
the user to remove data from the TrustChain whenever necessary, thus satisfying GDPR 
conditions under the right to erasure in addition to the right to data portability. Moreover, the 
underlying technology of the TrustChain service is built upon a trust management system and 
hence every interaction is monitored, and trust is evaluated accordingly to support future 
interactions. This fact essentially enables the accountability principle and allows the user to 
inform how its data is being used as demanded by the right to be informed condition in GDPR.  
4.2.  TrustChain vs Edge Computing 
Typically, an IoT ecosystem represents nodes ranging from small sensors (which only emit) 
data to massive complex data centers (which process billions of interactions per time). In the 
edge computing setup, these small sensors can be found at the bottom of the hierarchy. Nodes 
who have a comparatively higher processing power and storage lie in the middle of the 
network, and large data centers represent nodes at the cloud layer. It is challenging to 
implement conventional blockchain technologies towards the end of hierarchy due to 
associated resource restrictions to perform consensus algorithms and limited storage to store 
the massive public ledger. In contrast, the consensus protocol in TrustChain is simply a 
combination of trust and BFT and so computation power that can broadcast a set of messages 
is more than enough to implement the consensus algorithm. Therefore, TrustChain can be 
easily deployed towards the end of edge computing hierarchy. Furthermore, a lightweight 
protocol enables efficient processing of blocks while saving more energy compared to 
traditional blockchain technologies in which a rig of miners must coordinate with each other 
to solve a highly complex cryptographic puzzle. This, in fact, improves the performance of the 
overall system and prevents divergence of the ledger as nodes do not need to wait for much 
longer to identify the correct copy of the ledger in contrast to a traditional blockchain in which 
it can take at least ten minutes to add a new block to the genesis chain. 
Moreover, TrustChain uses a permissioned identity management protocol when selecting 
suitable validators like in Hyperledger. Application of TBP in TrustChain enables us to expand 
the TrustChain network just like in Bitcoin blockchain networks, in contrast to Hyperledger in 
which centralized authority is used to select the validators. Further, the trust service in the 
TrustChain works collaboratively with membership and policy services to identify trustworthy 
TB and discourage malicious nodes entering the TrustChain network, contributing to the 
mining process. This makes the consensus protocol described in Section 3.2 nearly immutable 
as only trustworthy nodes are given permission to perform the mining process. 
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Table 3: TrustChain vs traditional Blockchain technologies. 
Property Bitcoin Ethereum  Hyperledger TrustChain 
Permission Restrictions Permissionless Permissionless Permissioned  Permissioned 
Consensus PoW PoW PBFT Trust+BFT 
Energy Saving No Partial  Yes Yes 
Decentralized Regulation Yes Yes Partial Yes 
Smart Contracts No Yes Yes Yes 
Scalability 
Node High High Low High 
Performance Low Low High High 
Immunity 
25% of the 
Computing 
power 
51% of Stake 
33.3% of 
faulty 
replicas 
Nearly 
Immutable 
Native Currency Yes Yes No Possible 
Incentive Mining Fee Mining Fee No Trust 
Blockchain as a 
control chain 
No No No Yes 
Privacy No No Partial 
Yes (e.g. 
with ZKP) 
G
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be informed No support No support No support Support 
access Support Support Support Support 
rectification No support No support No support Support 
erasure No support No support No support Support 
restrict 
processing 
No support No support Support Support 
data 
portability 
No support No support Support Support 
object 
processing 
No support No support Partial Support 
control 
profiling 
No support No support Partial Support 
According to TrustChain architecture Trust Broker Pool (TBP) is a small portion of the global 
pool which consists millions of overlapping TBPs. One TBP contains 51% of trust nodes 
means, more than half of the global IoT nodes trust each other. This scenario is practically 
impossible to occur as it is impossible to create such a large trust network by an individual or 
even by multiple organizations as trust depends on many factors as discussed in the paper. 
Further, let’s assume 51% computing power is control by one organization. In such a situation, 
this organization can create a TBP consisting all of their computers. However, it is highly 
unlikely that all other nodes external to this specific TBP would trust all nodes inside one TBP 
in any circumstance. Therefore, this specific TBP cannot interfere with the decision making 
process as TrustChain consensus protocol is not based on the computer power but only on 
trustworthiness. Thus, having 51% computing power is also useless in TrustChain network to 
interfere with the consensus process. 
In addition, the trust service is useful to check the integrity of the data generated by IoT nodes 
as described in Section 3.1. This feature not only improves the overall experience of the 
prosumers but also guarantees accountability in case of a policy or privacy violation. In 
comparison to traditional versions of blockchain, it is only available with the TrustChain 
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platform as we discussed previously. Further, most of the numerical results based on the trust 
is carefully analyzed in our previous work [12-14], [36] and thus not repeated here. However, 
Table 3 summarizes the effectiveness of the proposed TrustChain architecture rationally over 
existing blockchain technologies as discussed in this work.  
5. Conclusions 
TrustChain is a permissioned blockchain network designed to enhance the privacy of its 
prosumers while improving the efficacy of TrustChain service compared to traditional 
blockchain technologies specifically in a distributed environment like the IoT. The major 
difference of TrustChain compared to traditional alternatives is the application of 
computational trust on realizing various functions inside the TrustChain service. Among them, 
evaluation of trust allowed to: i) develop a novel lightweight consensus management protocol 
by combining with the BFT protocol; ii) measure the trustworthiness of participating prosumers 
before creating smart contracts and before initiating interactions among them; iii) the 
membership and policy services to take intelligent decisions when adding new nodes to the 
network, selecting TBs, and realizing the accountability in case of consensus, privacy, or 
consent violation; and iv) check the integrity of each interaction before adding them to the 
genesis chain.  
Moreover, TrustChain empowers the edge computing architecture of IoT due to its 
survivability with low computing and storage resources which is not the case with traditional 
approaches. Nevertheless, this prevents the need for centralized processing such as at the cloud 
allowing to implement innovative privacy preserving solutions at the Fog and the ROOF via 
TrustChain membership and policy services. However, it is important to allow vertical services 
in parallel with horizontal services to facilitate many intelligent solutions. To enable such 
services, a decentralized exchange is introduced based on the smart contract concept to 
negotiate among vertical layers to combine data, and services in a vertical manner via 
TrustChain and beyond that. Nevertheless, TrustChain acts in a control layer in such cases to 
minimize the ledger size and enable an efficient orchestration among different services. 
Further, TrustChain is embedded with unique techniques to improve privacy when dealing with 
delicate personal information and to comply with GDPR legislation, for example using 
concepts like ZKP, encryption, and anonymization.    
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